PCTC Paper on Terrorism
(Philippines)
By
Police Superintendent Felipe
L Rojas
Deputy Director for Research
I.
Introduction
Terrorism has been recognized as the intentional use
of violence or the means to inflict damage or harm innocent civilians and
non-combatants (i.e. unarmed military
personnel or those who are not on-duty). At present, there is still no
international consensus or universally accepted definition of what constitutes
an act of terrorism. One useful working
definition is in the proposed Anti-Terrorism Act of 1995 in the Philippine
Senate which is the “use of violence, threat or intimidation or destruction of
lives and properties with the objective of creating a state of fear in the
public mind to achieve a purported political end, to coerce or to influence
their behavior, to undermine the confidence of the general public on the
government.”[1]
It has been established that
terrorism is also linked to drug trafficking, money laundering and other
transnational organized crime.[2] One could not exist without the other. Figure
1 below shows the inter-linking chain of different transnational
organized crimes. The question is
“Where do we begin?”
Fig 1. Links of Transnational crimes.[3]
Terrorism
in Southeast Asia registered a huge rise marked by the movement of huge
quantities of explosives by land and sea, as militants used it in macabre
suicide attacks on leading personalities or in mass attacks against strategic
or commercial targets.[4]
Shown below are the number of casualties in Southeast Asia per year:
|
YEAR |
CASUALTIES |
|
1993 |
135 |
|
1994 |
71 |
|
1995 |
5,639 |
II.
Philippine
Experience on Terrorism
A.
Activities
of International Terrorist Groups
Since 1986, three (3)
violent incidents in the country were attributed to international terrorist
groups. First was the
kidnapping-for-ransom of Mitsui Executive Noboyuki Wakaoji on November 15, 1986
at Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna. It was suspectedly perpetrated by the Japanese
Red Army (JRA) and the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army
(CPP/NPA). Investigation revealed that
the incident was a special joint operation called “Operation Customer” with
Japanese businessmen as targets of kidnap-for-ransom. The planning, coordination and supervision of the operation was
directed by three (3) top-ranking cadres of the NPA General Command in close
coordination with two (2) JRA members.
The ransom allegedly paid was $3 Million and Wakaoji was released on
December, 1986 in Quezon City. The
second incident was the bombing at Thomas Jefferson Cultural Center in Buendia
Ave., Makati City on January 19, 1991.
However, the bomb prematurely exploded killing the terrorist Ahmad Ahmad
and the wounding of Abdul Kadhim Saad, both Iraqi nationals. The third incident was the bombing of PAL
Flight 434 bound for Narita, Japan on December 11, 1994 resulting in the death
of a Japanese national and injuries to five others.
B.
Terrorist Organizations
1.
Domestic
Terrorist Groups
In the Philippines, the groups espousing violence
take on two forms: those with ethno-religious connection, such as the extremist
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the MILF and those which banner a
politico-ideological cause, such as the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People’s Army/National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NDF). Ralph Peters argues on Marxist/Maoist type
of warfare, “Wise competitors will not even attempt to defeat us on our terms;
rather they will seek to shift the playing field away from military
confrontation or turn to terrorism and non-traditional terms of assault.”[5]
These groups are apparently enjoying aid and support from foreign terrorist
organizations. The international linkage of the CPP, however, has been
considerably reduced. The violent
nature of the activities of the ethno-religious groups in Mindanao, such as the
ASG who have tendencies towards extremism, have created a disturbing effect on
the local government.
Other groups which have also been
advocating violence are the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). However,
the MNLF has already signed a peace agreement with the government, dissipating
possible threats of violence from them.
The GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement in September 1996, created the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao. However, the ASG and MILF rejected the agreement
signed by former President Fidel V. Ramos and MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari.
They see it as betrayal of the true ideals and aspiration of Muslim
Mindanao and, therefore, vowed to continue the armed struggle.
The following are the terrorist groups in
the Philippines:
a.
Abu
Sayyaf
The Abu
Sayyaf Group has a strength of 1,148 and assorted firearms of 386 as of
1998. Their units are concentrated in Basilan Province, Sulu Province and
Zamboanga City. The leadership of ASG
suffered a major setback with the death of their leader Abdurajak Janjalani
during the encounter with government forces on 18 December 1998. The group is engaged in extortion,
kidnap-for-ransom, piracy, highway robbery and hold-up to raise funds for the
procurement of war materials. Its
ultimate objective is to establish an independent Islamic Theocratic State in
Mindanao. It adheres to an extremist
view of Jihad Kital which lead them to commit terrorism and violence to advance
its cause. Most of their targets are
places of worship, religious personalities, public places and vital
installations.
Figure 2 shows the increasing strength of
the Abu Sayyaf group starting with 120 members in 1993 which increased to 1,150
members in 1998. The big jump was due
to massive recruitment by its leaders. Violence perpetrated by ASG has been
dramatic. The group advocates the
complete annihilation of all non-Muslims in Mindanao and has carried out
numerous atrocities to this end. The
worst attacks occurred in April 1995 when about 200 ASG members raided Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur escaped with 20 hostages who were used as human shield to
cover their retreat.[6]
b.
MILF
Strength and
Deployment –
The MILF headed by Hashim Salamat professes to the goal of establishing an
independent Islamic State in Mindanao.
It has strength of 13,459 regulars as of year-end 1998. The increase of 2,604 from previous year is
attributed to the mix-up of MILF and ASG elements and perhaps that of the
Muslim Islamic Liberation Organization (MILO) that became united under the Al
Sallafiyah. The group has estimated
10,227 assorted firearms. It continues
to maintain forty five (45) encampments scattered all over the provinces of
Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Saranggani, Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, Lanao
del Norte, North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Zamboanga del Sur and Sultan
Kudarat. They have intensified
extortion activities to support the said camps.
Financial Support and International
Links – A
certain Al Mokhru Ibrahim, a
member of Ikhwan Al Muslimen from Qatar, offered MILF Chairman fifty million
pesos (P50M) as initial funding for the construction of a hospital building at
Camp Abubakar, Maguindanao. The Ikhwan
Al Muslimen was founded by hardline fundamentalists from Egypt and Sudan. It is an international Islamic movement
currently undertaking Islamic expansion activities worldwide to promote Islamic
teaching. Also, a certain Hussain
Mustapha, a Saudi Arabian and close associate
of Mohammad Jamaal Khalifa, together with two unidentified Saudi Arabian
nationals visited Camp Abubakar to deliver
undetermined amount of
money for the installation of an international satellite communication
system to enable their leaders to get in touch with their foreign
supporters. The MILF
has already established their own internet website.
Other
financial supporters included three (3) Egyptian nationals who gave
undetermined amount of dollars to MILF Vice Chairman for Military Affairs Al
Had Murad. They also promised future
financial support to MILF.
Training – Three (3) Muslim foreign
nationals from Egypt and Afghanistan are handling the MILF Commando Training. A
former Sudanese, Lt. Col. Ahmad Al Gamen taught, bomb/explosives manufacture at
Camp Abubakar. He resigned from the
Sudanese Armed Forces in 1995 and joined the group of Osama Bin Ladin. He was tasked to sow terrorism against
Europeans in Pakistan. Al Gamen, reportedly a bearded Saudi Arabian
dissident, is said to have masterminded the bombings of US embassies at Kenya
and Tanzania last August 1998 in which 235 people died. Bin Laden is reportedly living in
Afghanistan but his violent words and ideas incited terrorist acts far away.[7]
The MILF has also sent students to Pakistan particularly in Mahad Mandolee,
Lahore for military training and Islamic studies. They have already completed Bangsa Moro Training (BMT) before
being sent to Pakistan.
c.
Mainstream
CPP/NPA/NDF
The
objectives of the mainstream CPP/NPA/NDF are the violent overthrow of the
government and to establish of a so-called “People’s Democratic Coalition
Government.” It aims to restructure
Philippine society based on the Marxist doctrine of classless society. The group is engaged in party-building,
army-building and united- front building.
The party considers political struggle as a mode of offensive action and
use peace negotiation as an instrument of warfare. The NPA wages guerilla warfare in the countryside and undertakes
partisan terroristic operations in selected urban centers. Then the NDF implements the united-front
programs of the CPP through its "cause-oriented and sectoral front
organizations.” The objective is to arouse anti-government militancy among the
“basic forces” of the labor, peasant, student, youth and urban poor sectors.
In Figure 3, the CPP/NPA/NDF
structure is governed by National Congress, Central Committee, Political Bureau
and Executive Committee. It has 17
regional Committees all over the country.
The main source of
support of the dissident terrorists is the people in the countryside. The
support is given either voluntarily or because of fear. In 1998, the Party collected an estimated
amount of P16 Million from local sources nationwide. From the Overseas Revolutionary Work (ORW), the party collected
P11.9 million in 1998. Throughout the
1970’s and 1980’s, the NPA received considerable financial and logistical
support from Libya as part of QADDAFI’s program to establish a string of
revolutionary movements in the Asia-Pacific region. Support from Tripoli included provisions of modern weaponry (such
as high-powered assault rifles, detonators, explosives RPGs and SAMs) as well
as training in strategic urban terrorist tactics. Libya also established an organization called the “Mathba” to try
and promote the image of the NPA (particularly in Australia) as a movement for
“liberty and freedom” instead of the armed wing of the CPP. The NPA also received support in the form of
weapons and training from North Korea in return for providing information on
the former US Clark Air and Subic Naval Bases, as well as on key American
military figures.
2.
International
Terrorist Groups
Following are the international
terrorist groups which had successfully established in the Philippine
territory:
a.
Yousef-Murad
Terrorist Cell
The discovery of an intricate and
clandestine group of international terrorists in 1991 ushered in a new
dimension to the Philippine security situation. The suspicion on their activities and presence in the country was
further bolstered by the arrest of Abdul Hakim Murad on January 7, 1995. Investigation later revealed that Murad was
a member of the “Liberation Army,” an organization committed to fighting the
United States and the Israeli governments.
Significant pieces of
information obtained from files encrypted from a recovered laptop computer also
revealed Murad’s association with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef as well as their plan to
bomb eleven (11) US commercial airlines flying the
Manila-Hongkong-Singapore-Los Angeles route.
This plot was to have been the centerpiece of the so-called “Oplan Bojinka”
which was revealed later to be an intricate and sophisticated network of
international terrorists using the country as a venue of their terrorist
activities. The bombing of a Philippine
Airlines jet bound for Japan from Cebu on 11 Dec 1994 was a test-run to the
said Oplan which included the bombing of US Airlines, American and Israeli
embassies, and training of local Islamic extremist groups.
The Murad arrest became instrumental
to the subsequent arrest of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, a Pakistani national who is the
alleged mastermind in the bombing of the World Trade Center, in New York City,
USA and the acknowledged leader of the “Liberation Army.” Yousef is an Afghan
war veteran who had received military training from Afghan rebel groups that
maintain bases in Western Pakistan.
Yousef recruited Murad to his extremist group and trained him in the
making and use of explosives for terroristic
purposes.
The arrest of Murad in Manila and
Yousef in Pakistan also brought to fore the plot of the group to assassinate
Pope John Paul II during his visit to Manila in 1995. Subsequently, a sequel to Oplan Bojinka was uncovered which
outlined three (3) phases of terroristic activities:
1.
Assassination
of top-ranking government officials, foreign ambassadors, diplomats, military/police
officials and big-business personalities;
2.
Bombing
of various commercial centers, foreign-owned
offices/infrastructures/establishments and vital government installations such
as power, water and communication; and
3.
Kidnapping-for-ransom
and robbery-hold-up activities, targeting among others, prominent
personalities, commercial banks and financial institutions.
The revelations made by Murad led to
the arrest of another suspected member of the Yousef terrorist cell, identified
as Usama Asmorai alias Wali Khan Shah or Hanses Grabi Ibrahim. Wali Khan, a Pakistani national, is also an
Afghan war veteran who admitted having close links with Yousef. He has gone to Zamboanga to conduct training
for the Abu Sayyaf Group. There was
also a report on the conduct of regimented training of suspected Islamic Fundamentalists of various
nationalities at Matabungkay, Lian, Batangas sometime in December, 1994. The group was reportedly composed of twenty
(20) members, five (5) of whom are confirmed Filipino Muslims while the rest
are Palestinians, Egyptians and an American.
b.
Japanese
Red Army
The JRA cell in the Philippines was
organized by Hiroshi Sensui and Norio Sasaki who entered the country in the
guise of setting-up business ventures.
Sensui was eventually arrested on June 6, 1998 in Manila and
subsequently deported to Japan.
c.
Abu
Nidal Organization
The ANO, founded in
1974, opposes all efforts of political reconciliation of Israel and Arab
countries. It is a well-funded and
financially stable terrorist organization based in the Middle East. Its activities were revealed with the arrest
of five of its members in December 1987 and one ranking member, Ehmad Yousef,
in Metro Manila in 1989. The arrest led
to the discovery of the group’s plans to conduct attacks/bombings at the former
US Military facility, Clark Air Force Base, in Angeles City, Pampanga.
C.
Local Links of International Terrorists
A disturbing element of the
discovery of an international terrorist cell in the country is the fact that the
latter would not have existed without the support from domestic terrorist
group. The Yousef-Wali Khan-Janjalani
connection persisted because all three had one common denominator and that they
were all Afghan war veterans. Likewise,
they espouse the same political and ideological objective which is the spread
of Islam through jihad or holy war.
They follow the same means of advancing their cause – the use of
violence and terrorism, and they have a common extremist view of the Islamic
faith.
Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani is the founder and
leader of the local extremist/terroristic group known as the
Al-Harakat-Al-Islamiya or Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) operating in Mindanao. He was killed during an engagement with PNP
elements in 1998 in Basilan province. The
ASG has a predisposition to violence in pursuing its objective of establishing
an independent Theocratic Islamic State in Mindanao. It also provided the support network of the Yousef cell in the
country.
Yousef visited Mindanao in the early part of 1994 to
meet Abu Sayyaf members and sought their support to establish cells in the
National Capital Region, while promising to train ASG hardliners on modern way
of improvising explosive devices. It
was during this trip that he also revealed his plan of assassinating the Pope
and the role of the ASG to claim responsibility to gain propaganda mileage as
this will internationalize their image.
Logistical support for the plot would have also to be
provided. A connection was made through
bank transactions of one Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, a wealthy Saudi national who
is reported to be an Islamic Missionary in the Philippines and a close friend
of Janjalani. Khalifa’s link with
international terrorist organizations can be traced through his membership in
the Al Afghani, a newly-formed Islamic militant group of Afghan war
veterans. The Al Afghan has close and
direct links with international terrorist organizations.
The Abu Sayyaf links with international terrorist
organizations are facilitated by some local NGOs and foreign organizations with
offices in the country. Currently, there are 310 foreign organizations or
entities which are not terrorist organizations per se, but offer a wide range
of opportunities for terrorist infiltration.
As can be gleaned, the linkage passes through several levels, namely:
local and foreign NGOs, business corporations, personalities and foreign
militant groups. Religious
consideration may have been a factor to the Abu Sayyaf Group receiving help and
training in Afghanistan. Filipinos
there fought under the aegis of extremist Rasool Sayyaf.[8] The training is done through funding from
various sympathetic organizations.
The ASG also has links with Libyan
groups. This was confirmed when
Abdurajak Janjalani traveled to Libya to attend an international conference
sometime in the last quarter of 1993 or first quarter of 1994. During this conference, Janjalani was
elected Amir Al Islamiya (Islamic Spiritual/Leader) and the name Al Harakat Al
Islamiya (AHAI) was adopted to replace the name Abu Sayyaf. The influence of Libya on the Abu Sayyaf was
likewise highlighted when the Libyan Ambassador acted as intermediary for the
release of American missionary, Charles Walton, who was abducted in December,
1994. One of the demands of Abu Sayyaf was
the lifting of US economic sanctions on Libya.
It is likewise significant to note
that the Libyan-supported HAMAS has developed links with AHAI. This was revealed when three (3) suspected
foreign terrorists together with a local terrorist were arrested on 21 April
1995 at Davao City. Firearms, explosive
devices and HAMAS publications were found in their possession. Of those
arrested, Nedal Saldeh Odeh (aka Abu Turab), a Kuwaiti national, was identified
as HAMAS member since the late 80’s and the leader of Al Gamma, a terrorist cell operating in the Philippines.
D. High – risk Foreign Nationals
Another important factor to consider
in international terrorism is the
influx of “high risk foreign nationals”, who entered the Philippines for
seemingly legitimate purposes. However,
subsequent arrests of several of them as suspected terrorists raised the
concerns over their influx into the country.
Pakistanis topped the list followed by Iranians and then Egyptians. Notably, the quarterly arrivals of Pakistanis
remained at the 800-1,000 level.
Relatedly, unconfirmed reports disclosed that some news reporters at
Ninoy Aquino International Airport are involved in human smuggling thereat.[9]
The going rate for illegal alien seeking entry into the country through
Immigration Departure desk is a staggering
One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00).
In 1994, thirty (30) foreign
nationals suspected to be terrorists were arrested during the joint operations
conducted by different law enforcers in Metro Manila, Bulacan and Davao
City. Four (4) others voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities but were subsequently released for lack of
evidence. The arrested foreign
nationals carried Pakistani, Jordanian, Omani, Syrian, Palestinian. Iraqi,
Sudanese or Saudi passports. Of the
total arrested suspects, twenty-six (26) were charged with illegal possession
of firearms and explosives but twelve (12) of them were released on bail, seven
(7) were released, and one (1) was turned-over to United States authorities for
lack of evidence.
III.
Philippine
Government Policies on Terrorism
All current
counter-terrorist measures are based mainly on Presidential pronouncements
and Executive Orders. Foremost among these are the following:
a.
The
Philippine government has declared a total war against terrorism.
b.
The
government will not abdicate its duty to protect the nation, most especially
non-combatants who are usually the victims of terrorism.
c.
All
terrorist actions are considered as criminal acts and the government will
undertake all lawful measures to prevent them and bring to justice those who
commit terroristic activities.
d.
The
Philippine government subscribes to all international conventions and
initiatives against terrorism.
e. The government will exhaust all legal means and secure a
peaceful resolution of the conflict to minimize if not prevent the loss of
lives and destructions to properties.
f.
The
government must forge a strong partnership with the people.
g.
There
will be no sanctuary or “safehaven” for terrorist.
IV.
Conceptual
framework for counter-terrorism
Based
on the aforestated, these national policies ensure the protection of Philippine
interests and resources. The general framework for the national strategy takes
into consideration the threat to the environment, political realities, moral
and legal traditions, and the human and physical resources available. It likewise recognizes the primacy of the
PNP in dealing with any criminal act, including those undertaken for the
purpose of terrorism. Furthermore, in
addressing any terrorist-related incident, the crisis management organizations
as well as all police and military units are expected to be generally guided
and implement the stated national policies.
The national strategy
is composed of two components: proactive and responsive. The proactive component of the strategy is
composed of anti-terrorism measures which are intended to prevent or reduce the
probability of terrorist attacks and maintain a secure environment for the
national populace. On the other hand,
the responsive component of the strategy is focused on actual counter-actions
responding to an ongoing terrorist incident.
The government employed
some strategies to suppress the activities of terrorist groups. These are the
following:
A.
Preventive efforts
The
Proactive component focuses on the cooperation and linkages among law
enforcement agencies in preventing the activities of the terrorists.
The
following are some of the preventive efforts of the government in countering
terrorism:
1.
Establishment
of international linkages and cooperation.
2.
Improvement
of intelligence capabilities.
3.
Strengthening
of preventive and security measures for effective Border Control and Aviation
and Maritime Security.
4.
Enhancement
of mechanisms for effective immigration control and protection of the integrity
of travel documents.
5.
Development
of PNP/AFP counter-terrorist capabilities.
6.
Development
of doctrines for countering terrorism.
7.
Improvement
of the legal framework.
8.
Close
coordination and cooperation with other government agencies.
9.
Strengthening
of security measures for transportation, communication and other vital
installations.
B.
Responsive Capabilities
Since preventive measures alone do
not guarantee immunity from terrorism, it must be backed up by a comprehensive
response capability to deal quickly and effectively with any terrorist
act. Having an effective response
capability also serves as a deterrent, which in turn contributes to prevention,
such as following:
1.
The
Crisis Management Committees (CMCs) will normally take cognizance of
terrorist-related crisis situations except those with national or international
impact, in which case the NACAHT board will take cognizance.
2.
Crisis
situations involving foreign nationals or facilities.
3.
Involvement
of Filipinos in terrorist incidents.
4.
Handling
of crisis at the lowest levels possible.
5.
Graduated
armed response.
6.
Non-compromise
with terrorists.
7.
Respect
for human rights.
8.
Handling
of hostage situations.
9.
Media
management and public information.
V.
Difficulties
in Counter-Terrorism Operations
The results of the government’s counter-terrorism
campaign should have had
far more deterrent effects had it not been for certain
problems and constraints encountered by law enforcement agencies, particularly
those dealing with suspected foreign terrorist groups operating in the country.
There is no law that specifically
addresses terrorism. It must be pointed
out that terrorism is not like any ordinary crime in which the elements of the
offense could be found in the Revised Penal Code. The existing laws that we have make it difficult for our law
enforcement agencies to file a strong case against foreign nationals suspected
of involvement in acts constituting terrorism.
Many of the arrested suspected
foreign terrorists have been released, not necessarily because they are
innocent but more often than not because law enforcement agencies cannot file
the appropriate criminal charges against them.
A typical example was the case of
Abdul Hakim Murad, who was arrested on 7 January 1995 but was later on turned
over to the US authorities as we do not have the laws that could prosecute and
convict him for his acts of terrorism.
More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that we do not have the laws to
prosecute and convict those performing crucial functions as part of the support
network/system of the terrorist groups.
It should be noted that most of the
countries in the world, in their efforts to suppress terrorism, have enacted
internal security acts or anti-subversive laws. Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore which were
historically confronted with internal security problems have successfully
contained them through these acts/laws.
VI.
Philippine
Center on Transnational Crime
The signing of Executive Order No. 62 on January 15,
1999 by President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is a big step in the fight against
international and domestic terrorism in the Philippines. The Executive Order created the Philippine
Center on Transnational Crime (PCTC) which calls for the formulation and
implementation of a concerned program of action of all law enforcement,
intelligence and other government agencies for the prevention and control of
transnational crime including terrorism.
The PCTC would serve as the nucleus and linkage of all the law
enforcement agencies involved in the anti-terrorist operations. Then, a central database would be
established at the Center through modern information and telecommunications
technology to provide information to concerned agencies on the terrorist groups,
methodologies, areas of operation and prior arrest and convictions. This is necessary considering that the most
of the local law enforcement agencies are concentrating their operations on the
domestic terrorist groups while the activities of international terrorist
groups are not monitored.
The Philippine Center on Transnational Crime would
also serve as the core group of the soon to be organized ASEAN Center for
Combating Transnational Crime here in Manila.
This was the commitment of President Estrada during the 6th
ASEAN Summit on December 15, 1998 at Hanoi, Vietnam upon realizing the growing
threat of transnational crime. The
rapid globalization and the unrestricted movement of people, commodities,
information and ideas have provided a conducive environment for transnational
crime. There is a need, therefore, for
countries to close ranks and put-up unified effort to fight this new phenomenon
and increasing threat to World Peace.
VII.
Assessment
The terrorist threat is real. It has been established that international
terrorists
are
in the country, that they have local counterparts, and that there exists a complex network to
support their activities. It is a
threat we have to face and prepare for.
Paul John, a British journalist and
former editor of the New Statesman in his article, The Seven (7) Deadly Sins of
Terrorism, illustrates just how serious the threat of terrorism is today:
“A free
society that reacts to terrorism by invoking authoritarian methods necessarily
damages itself. But an even greater
danger – and much more common today – is that free societies, in their anxiety
to avoid authoritarian excesses, fail to arm themselves against the terrorist
threat, and so abdicate their responsibility to uphold the law. The terrorists succeed when they provoke
oppression, and they triumph when they are met with appeasement. The seventh and deadliest sin of terrorism
is that it saps the will of a civilized society to defend itself.”
Transnational
organized crime and terrorism can no longer be written off as “boutique”
law-enforcement problem. This issue has
become central to security and international foreign policy concern in the
post-cold war era, extending far beyond the scope of conventional law
enforcement.[10] The difficulty is that many law enforcement
agencies focus on the domestic peace and order problem but are
slow to recognize
the increasingly transnational nature of crime.
The sporadic foreign terroristic
activities in the Philippines and the link of local terrorist with foreign
counterparts show that the country is a potential area of operations by active
terrorist groups. Probable targets like
foreign embassies, foreign airlines or prominent persons are vulnerable to
attacks. Foreign support to local
terrorists and certain weaknesses of government’s capabilities are areas of
concern. There must also be
international agreements for a common dedication to develop national
law-enforcement systems capable of fulfilling international obligations.”[11]
ENDNOTES
